Israeli Military Inquiry Acknowledges "Complete Failure" in Preventing Hamas-Led Attack of October 7, 2023
An Israeli military investigation into the series of errors leading up to and during the Hamas-led attack on October 7, 2023, has acknowledged the army’s "complete failure" to prevent it. The attack, which investigators described as highly coordinated and years in the making, saw Hamas fighters break out of Gaza and target Israeli communities and a music festival near the border. The assault resulted in 1,139 deaths and approximately 250 people taken captive.
The report highlights a history of misconceptions about the threat posed by Hamas, a refusal to heed warning signs, and the army’s inability to coordinate an effective response. While the investigation exposes military failures, similar probes into political shortcomings have been repeatedly blocked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition.
How Did Israel’s Army Underestimate Hamas?
The report reveals that the Israeli military had a decades-long "fundamental misunderstanding" of Hamas, leading senior officers to underestimate the group’s capabilities and intentions. Military planners assumed Hamas posed no significant threat, was uninterested in large-scale conflict, and that its tunnel networks had been degraded. They also believed Israel’s high-tech separation barrier could easily thwart any cross-border threat.
Despite warning signs, such as unusual Hamas activities, Israeli authorities insisted the group was focused on governing Gaza and would attack via rockets rather than a ground invasion. Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was also misjudged, with assumptions that he was "not interested in a wider war."
What Warning Intelligence Did Israel Ignore Before the Attack?
In the hours before the attack, the Israeli military either ignored or misinterpreted several indicators of an impending assault. Female spotters reported unusual border activity the night before, and officers noted the mass activation of Israeli SIM cards in Hamas’s possession, as well as suspicious rocket deployment movements. Commanders dismissed these as signs of a routine military exercise.
How Did Israeli Intelligence Misinterpret Events?
The report states that Hamas began planning the October 2023 incursion as early as 2016. However, Israeli intelligence dismissed such reports as "unrealistic," believing Hamas had been deterred by Israel’s response to the May 2021 uprising. The army later realized Hamas had decided to launch the assault by April 2022 and was 85% ready by September of that year, setting October 7 as the attack date.
What Were the Israeli Operational Failures That Day?
The army was unprepared for the attack, and troop deployment was significantly delayed, allowing Hamas fighters to advance with little resistance. In Kibbutz Nir Oz, which the army allegedly abandoned, a survivor told the Israeli chief of staff that Hamas fighters had left long before Israeli troops arrived.
Military planners also vastly underestimated the scale of the attack, which involved 5,600 fighters in three waves, supported by 4,000 rockets and 57 drones. Israel’s Gaza Division, with just over 700 soldiers, was overwhelmed and remained "defeated" for hours. Reinforcements arrived only around 12:00 PM (10:00 GMT).
The report also notes that the Israeli air force struggled to distinguish between Hamas fighters and civilians, leading to some friendly fire incidents. Additionally, many aircraft were deployed to target senior Hamas commanders’ homes rather than defending civilians and soldiers under attack.
Did Commanders Order the Hannibal Directive?
Yes, according to several Israeli newspapers, including Haaretz. The Hannibal Directive, which mandates using all necessary force to prevent soldiers from being captured, was issued during the attack. This included killing anyone in the vicinity, even civilian non-combatants. Some pilots reportedly refused to act on the directive, but investigations confirmed civilian casualties, including Efrat Katz, who was killed by helicopter fire while being transported to Gaza.
In Kibbutz Be’eri, an Israeli tank fired shells into a house holding over a dozen captives, including 12-year-old twins. Only two captives survived.
What Are the Key Takeaways?
- Missed Warnings: Key indicators, such as increased fighter activity and intelligence reports, were either ignored or misinterpreted.
- Underestimation: The army underestimated the scale of the attack, leading to inadequate preparation and response.
- Poor Coordination: Delayed troop deployment, poor communication, and insufficient reinforcement exacerbated the failures.
- Unanswered Questions: No investigation has been conducted into the government’s actions before and during the attack.
The report underscores systemic failures within the Israeli military, while political accountability remains unaddressed.
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