Europe Embracing Nuclear Weapons Would Be a Catastrophic Error

The second term of US President Donald Trump has triggered profound shifts in Europe’s security landscape. Rising concerns about American withdrawal and the potential collapse of post-World War II security structures have pushed European leaders to seek alternative solutions.

Prior to last month’s German elections, Friedrich Merz, the head of the Christian Democratic Union and the expected next German chancellor, commented: “We need to engage in discussions with both the British and the French—the two European nuclear powers—about whether nuclear sharing, or at least nuclear security from the UK and France, could also extend to us.”

Last week, French President Emmanuel Macron responded to Merz by stating that he has decided to “open the strategic debate on protecting our allies on the European continent through our [nuclear] deterrence.”

The idea of a European nuclear sharing arrangement involving France and the United Kingdom to counter threats from Moscow is not new. Variations of this proposal have been circulating for decades.

However, reviving this idea today is not only a geopolitical miscalculation but also a strategic dead end. It reflects a misunderstanding of both the nuclear balance of power and the existential risks of further fragmenting Europe’s security architecture. Rather than strengthening deterrence, this move risks exacerbating the instability it aims to prevent.

Amid the growing unpredictability of US-Russia relations under Trump’s second term, Europe must move away from nuclear escapism and embrace a bold agenda of diplomatic engagement focused on nuclear disarmament.

The fantasy of European nuclear sharing

The proposal for European nuclear sharing fails on both arithmetic and strategic grounds. Russia’s nuclear arsenal includes 5,580 warheads, featuring hypersonic Avangard glide vehicles and Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). This vastly surpasses the combined Anglo-French stockpile of 515 warheads.

This imbalance is not merely numerical; it is also doctrinal. Moscow’s “escalate to de-escalate” strategy is a calculated approach to conflict escalation designed to force adversaries into concessions. This is a strategy that the British and French nuclear arsenals, optimized for minimal deterrence, cannot counter.

Defense spending data reveals a deeper flaw: Europeans lack the funds and technological capabilities to implement such a plan while pursuing their ambitious rearmament goals.

Germany’s €90.6 billion ($98 billion) military budget remains hampered by inefficiencies, with only 50 percent of army equipment meeting NATO readiness standards. Meanwhile, France and the UK lack the conventional force multipliers—global surveillance networks, intelligence capabilities, or even complete nuclear triads—that underpin US extended deterrence. Even if every euro of the EU’s recently announced €800 billion ($867 billion) defense boost were allocated to nuclear weapons programs, it would still take decades to establish the production complexes needed for a credible deterrent.

Attempting to replicate NATO’s nuclear-coalition model on a European level ignores six decades of integrated command structures and fails to address the hybrid threats that define modern conflict.

Moreover, replacing one dependency with another solves nothing. While proponents argue that nuclear sharing offers protection, the reality is that it can lead to strategic subjugation.

Neither France nor the UK is likely to relinquish control over its nuclear arsenals to the EU. As a result, any nuclear-sharing agreement would reduce Germany and other participating European countries to mere warhead storage sites with no real decision-making power. This Potemkin deterrence—all show, no substance—would only further irritate Washington.

Trump has already demonstrated his willingness to abandon allies if he sees no benefit to US strategic interests. His recent decisions to halt intelligence sharing and military aid for Ukraine and his conditioning of mutual defense on military spending have exposed the unraveling of NATO’s norms—the alliance is witnessing a collapse of shared purpose.

As experts note, Trump’s “MAGA Carta” foreign policy explicitly rejects strategic altruism. A European nuclear caucus would signal panic, validating Trump’s transactional worldview while undermining NATO’s cohesion.

A European nuclear club would deepen fragmentation, emboldening revisionist actors like Russia and China while diverting resources from critical gaps in AI advancement, sustainable economic output, and energy resilience that define 21st-century power.

The economic argument further highlights the folly. Pouring billions of euros from Europe’s finite resources into redundant warheads, while neglecting practical gaps in conventional capability, isn’t statecraft—it’s generational malpractice.

Disarmament and fiscal realpolitik

The EU’s opportunity lies not in nuclear posturing but in revitalizing arms control and mediation. The collapse of the US-Russia strategic dialogue following the invasion of Ukraine has left critical arms control frameworks in disarray.

The New START treaty, which limits deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1,550 each for Russia and the US, remains the last pillar of bilateral arms control. Its expiration in 2026 without a successor would mark the first time since 1972 that the world’s nuclear superpowers operate without mutually verified limits—a scenario that could trigger a new nuclear arms race.

This presents Europe’s opportunity. Rather than pursuing a European nuclear umbrella, it could lead efforts to revive nuclear disarmament dialogue.

Austria, an EU member, has already played a key role in nuclear talks between the West and Iran, as well as the 2020 US-Russia-China trilateral arms control discussions. This positions it as an ideal venue for restarting negotiations on nuclear risk reduction, especially at a time when Washington is open to renewed dialogue with Moscow.

Taking a lead on nuclear disarmament would reflect a more mature interpretation of security policy, as opposed to chasing the impossible goal of a European nuclear deterrent.

Some critics argue that negotiating with Russia rewards aggression. Yet history shows that even bitter adversaries can cooperate on arms control when interests align. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which eliminated 2,692 missiles, was finalized after years of heightened tensions between the USSR and the US in the early 1980s.

The treaty succeeded not because US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev trusted each other, but because dismantling missiles saved both sides significant funds that would have been spent on continuing the arms race and maintaining the destroyed arsenal.

Today, with Russia’s economy struggling due to the war in Ukraine and Trump’s focus on cost-cutting, there is an opportunity to pursue another deal if disarmament is framed not as idealism but as fiscal pragmatism. Europe can broker a deal that benefits all parties economically—and ensures humanity’s survival.

The unintended consequences of Trump’s first-term nuclear gambits—escalated arms races, eroded alliances, and emboldened adversaries—offer cautionary lessons. His second term, however, presents an opportunity to move the Doomsday Clock back from its current position of 89 seconds to midnight.

Europe now faces a choice: to cling to Cold War relics as the planet faces existential threats, or to pioneer a security paradigm that prioritizes planetary survival over great-power vanity. The decision it makes will shape not only Europe’s future but the future of all humanity.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.